Burden Sharing Emissions and Climate Change: A Theoretic Welfare Approach

The approximated cost-benefit function of pollution abatement from two integrated assessment models are employed in constructing of social welfare functions (SWF). Following a normative approach and evaluating equally the environmental goods in rich and poor countries, furthermore using distributional weights, a relation between elasticity of marginal utility epsilon and inequality aversion parameter gamma is established. By maximizing the global social welfare, the optimal pollution abatement level are found. The relation between the income elasticity of marginal utility epsilon and the inequality aversion parameter gamma allow to narrow the variation of epsilon for a particular value of gamma. As a consequence, smaller variation for optimal abatement levels are obtained, which allows to inspect if the Kyoto abatement objectives respect the requirement of evaluating equally the environmental goods in rich and poor countries.cost-benefit analysis, distributional weights, global warming, welfare theory, integrated assessment modeling

The case of two self-enforcing international agreements for environmental protection

Abstract Non-cooperative game theoretical models of self-enforcing international environmental agreements (IEAs) that employ the cartel stability concept of d'Aspremont et al. (1983) frequently use the assumption that countries can sign a single agreement only. We modify the assumption by considering two self-enforcing IEAs. Extending a model of Barrett (1994a) on a single self-enforcing IEA, we demonstrate that there are many similarities between one and two self-enforcing IEAs. But in the case of few countries and high environmental damage we show that two self-enforcing IEA work far better than one self-enforcing IEA in terms of both welfare and environmental equalityKeywords: self-enforcing international environmental agreements; non-cooperative game the- ory; stability; nonlinear optimization

A note on optimal transfer schemes, stable coalition for environmental protection and joint maximization assumption

Using the FUND model, an impact assessment is conducted over the 21st century for rises in sea level of up to 2-m/century and a range of socio-economic scenarios downscaled to the national level, including the four SRES storylines. This model balances the costs of retreat with the costs of protection, including the effects of coastal squeeze. While the costs of sea-level rise increase with greater rise due to greater damage and protection costs, the model suggests that an optimum response in a benefit-cost sense remains widespread protection of developed coastal areas, as identified in earlier analyses. The socio-economic scenarios are also important in terms of influencing these costs. In terms of the four components of costs considered in FUND, protection dominates, with substantial costs from wetland loss under some scenarios. The regional distribution of costs shows that a few regions experience most of the costs, especially East Asia, North America, Europe and South Asia. Importantly, this analysis suggests that protection is much more likely and rational than is widely assumed, even with a large rise in sea level. This is underpinned by the strong economic growth in all the SRES scenarios: without this growth, the benefits of protection are significantly reduced. It should also be noted that some important limitations to the analysis are discussed, which collectively suggest that protection may not be as widespread as suggested in the FUND results. Equity weighting allows the damages to be modified to reflect the wealth of those impacted by sea-level rise. Taking these distributional issues into account increases damage estimates by a factor of three, reflecting that the costs of sea-level rise fall disproportionately on poorer developing countries.Transfers play an important role in modeling International Environmental Agreements (IEA). We examine the implementation mechanism of Optimal Transfer Sharing Scheme (Carraro et al., 2006) which try to enable the existence of stable coalitions for environmental protection by side transfers. There are many coalitions where the OPTS can possibly be implemented. However, the implementation mechanism is almost impossible as it requests the ow of welfare from a few countries to the rest of coalition members, which is unrealistic. If the joint welfare maximization assumption is replaced with the assumption that the emission levels of coalition members are uniformly deceased by a constant percentage in comparison to fully non-cooperative coalition structure, then the free riding incentives are signicantly weakened. As a consequence there are possibilities to implement an OPTS and enable existence of stable coalitions.stable international environmental agreements; climate policy; coalition formation; transfers; integrated assessment modeling

A short note on joint welfare maximization assumptions

Non-cooperative game theoretical models of international environmental agreements (IEAs) use the assumption that coalition of signatories maximize their joint welfare. The joint maxi- mization assumption is compared with di®erent sharing pro¯t schemes such as Shapley value, Nash bargaining solution and Consensus Value. The results show that the joint welfare max- imization assumption is similar with Nash Bargaining solution.game theory, coalition formation, joint welfare maximization, Shapley value, Nash bargaining solution, Consensus Value, international environmental agreements

The case of two self-enforcing international agreements for environmental protection

Abstract Non-cooperative game theoretical models of self-enforcing international environmental agreements (IEAs) that employ the cartel stability concept of d'Aspremont et al. (1983) frequently use the assumption that countries can sign a single agreement only. We modify the assumption by considering two self-enforcing IEAs. Extending a model of Barrett (1994a) on a single self-enforcing IEA, we demonstrate that there are many similarities between one and two self-enforcing IEAs. But in the case of few countries and high environmental damage we show that two self-enforcing IEA work far better than one self-enforcing IEA in terms of both welfare and environmental equalit

Green Public Procurement for Imaging Equipment. Technical Background Report

The report proposes and substantiates the EU Green Public Procurement criteria for the product group of ‘Imaging Equipment". Green Public Procurement criteria allow public authorities to integrate environmental aspects in their purchasing decisions. The report contains the criteria proposal itself, the underlying scientific evidence regarding the environmental impacts of imaging equipment, and it describes the most important European legislation and labelling schemes relevant for this product group. Discussions with stakeholders from industry, NGOs and Member States have supported the development of the criteria. These contributions are also reflected in the analysis presented in this report.JRC.J.5-Sustainable Production and Consumptio

Matrices with the consecutive ones property, interval graphs and their applications

Matrices with the consecutive ones property and interval graphs are important notations in the field of applied mathematics. We give a theoretical picture of them in first part. We present the earliest work in interval graphs and matrices with the consecutive ones property pointing out the close relation between them. We pay attention to Tucker's structure theorem on matrices with the consecutive ones property as an essential step that requires a deep considerations. Later on we concentrate on some recent work characterizing the matrices with the consecutive ones property and matrices related to them in the terms of interval digraphs as the latest and most interesting outlook on our topic. Within this framework we introduce a classiffcation of matrices with consecutive ones property and matrices related to them. We describe the applications of matrices with the consecutive ones property and interval graphs in different fields. We make sure to give a general view of application and their close relation to our studying phenomena. Sometimes we mention algorithms that work in certain fields. In the third part we give a polyhedral approach to matrices with the consecutive ones property. We present the weighted consecutive ones problem and its relation to Tucker's matrices. The constraints of the weighted consecutive ones problem are improved by introducing stronger inequalities, based on the latest theorems on polyhedral aspect of consecutive ones property. Finally we implement a separation algorithm of Oswald and Reinhelt on matrices with the consecutive ones property. We would like to mention that we give a complete proof to the theorems when we consider important within our framework. We prove theorems partially when it is worthwhile to have a closer look, and we omit the proof when there are is only an intersection with our studying phenomena